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CITIZENS, ALIENS, MEMBERSHIP 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 
T. Alexander Aleiniko.ff* 
Immigration law inhabits the backwaters of constitutional ju-
risprudence. Grounded in nineteenth century principles of interna-
tional law and murky notions of "inherent power" and 
"sovereignty," it has remained outside the currents that fundamen-
tally reshaped constitutional law in the second half of this century. 
For years, thoughtful commentators have suggested that immigra-
tion law could survive, and ought to be made to survive, closer con-
stitutional scrutiny.' Why have these scholarly efforts been so 
singularly ineffective? 
The answer does not lie in the cogency of judicial analysis of 
immigration questions. The modern cases make little attempt to 
provide a coherent theoretical structure. Nor can tradition alone be 
the explanation, despite Justice Frankfurter's claim that constitu-
tional doctrine regarding the immigration power "has become 
about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of 
our body politic as any aspect of our government. "z The most egre-
gious-and still controlling-immigration decisions trace from the 
time of Plessy v. Ferguson, a case the Supreme Court wisely dis-
carded despite its reign of half a century. 
I will suggest in this essay that current constitutional norms 
defining the federal immigration power are shaped by a membership 
model of citizenship and alienage. The Constitution is understood 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. An early draft of this paper 
was originally presented at the "After the Bicentennial" conference held at the Georgetown 
University Law Center, November 13·15, 1987. The author gratefully acknowledges the ex-
ceedingly helpful comments of participants at the Georgetown conference and of Linda Bos-
niak, Dan Farber, Larry Fuchs, David Martin, Gerry Lynch, Mari Matsuda, Gerry Neuman, 
Robert Post, Carol Sanger, Peter Schuck, Nomi Stolzenberg, James Boyd White, and mem-
bers of the University of Michigan Public Law workshop. As always (although sometimes 
unstated), a special thanks to Yale Kamisar. 
I. E.g., Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1389-96 (1953); Henkin, The Constitution and 
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 853 (1987); Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional 
Power, 1984 S. CT. REV. 255; Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Commu-
nity: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 165 (1983). 
2. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). 
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as recognizing or establishing a "national community," and one be-
longs to that community by being a citizen. Immigration policy, 
conceived of as membership rules, is thought to lie at the core of 
national self-determination and self-definition. Permanently resid-
ing aliens3 are seen as less than full members, and aliens outside the 
country are generally considered non-members. 
I will argue that if membership is to be the guiding principle 
for constitutional analysis of the immigration power, then the circle 
of membership should include permanently residing aliens. More 
broadly, I will suggest that the immigration power be reconceptual-
ized. Rather than seeing it as concerned with deep notions of 
"membership in a national community," the immigration power 
ought to be seen as one of many powers Congress exercises in pur-
suit of the national welfare. Unlinking the immigration power from 
theories of membership will undermine the current regime of immi-
gration exceptionalism that has left the immigration power largely 
immune to the constitutional norms applied to other congressional 
powers. 
I 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that Congress has 
"plenary" power over immigration and naturalization. Justice 
Frankfurter accurately stated the Court's view when he wrote: 
"[T]he underlying policies of what classes of aliens shall be allowed 
to enter and what classes of aliens shall be allowed to stay, are for 
Congress exclusively to determine even though such determination 
may be deemed to offend American traditions .... " 4 
Congress acts essentially free from any constitutional limits 
when it defines the categories of aliens entitled to enter,s designates 
categories of excludable aliens,6 establishes admission and detention 
procedures at the border,7 mandates the deportation of aliens resid-
3. "Permanently residing aliens" refers to those aliens authorized to remain indefi-
nitely in the United States (provided they do not undertake conduct that renders them de-
portable) and generally eligible to seek naturalization. Thus, the category includes aliens who 
enter the U.S. on immigrant visas (such aliens are usually referred to as "lawful permanent 
residents" or "permanent resident aliens"), aliens granted asylum or refugee status, and aliens 
legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The category does not 
include non-immigrants (such as students or tourists), aliens paroled into the country, or 
aliens who entered without inspection (undocumented aliens). 
4. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
5. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
6. Kliendeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
7. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rei. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex 
rei. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
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ing in the country,s denies resident aliens benefits9 and federal em-
ployment, w permits the interdiction on the high seas of aliens 
seeking to come to the United States, 11 and defines classes of aliens 
ineligible for U.S. citizenship.l2 To be sure, the Court has applied 
constitutional norms of due process in deportation proceedings.l3 
But, because deportation is held not to constitute "punishment," 
substantive grounds of deportation may not be challenged as cruel 
and unusual punishment, ex post facto laws, or bills of attainder.l4 
The Court's immigration cases bristle with language that 
sounds anachronistic to the modern constitutional lawyer: 
"Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due pro-
cess as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."1s "Congress reg-
ularly makes rules [under its immigration power] that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens."l6 "Our cases 'have long recog-
nized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sover-
eign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments 
largely immune from judicial control.' "17 
In other areas, the combination of harsh rules imposing serious 
harms on individuals and an incorrigible bureaucracy has led the 
Court to adopt and enforce a rights-oriented jurisprudence. What 
explains the persistent judicial modesty in the immigration area in 
the late twentieth century? 
The more recent opinions do not attempt to provide a theoreti-
cal foundation for continued judicial deference. They simply report 
that prior cases have called for such deference. As dissenting Jus-
tices have noted from time to time,1s tracing these cases to their 
nineteenth century origins is an embarrassment to constitutional 
8. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
9. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
10. Although exclusion of aliens from the federal Civil Service by the Civil Service 
Commission was invalidated in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), lower 
courts had no trouble sustaining the exclusion once it was promulgated by the president. See, 
e.g., Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979). 
II. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd on 
other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
12. Chinese and Japanese aliens were not eligible to naturalize until the mid-1900s. For 
the first few decades of this century, women who married aliens (even if they lived in the 
U.S.) lost U.S. citizenship. The Supreme Court had little difficulty upholding this provision. 
MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). 
13. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
14. E.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
u.s. 698 (1893). 
15. United States ex rei. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
16. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1967). 
17. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex 
rei. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)). 
18. E.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 868-77 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Harisia-
des v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 599-600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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law. The foundational decisions upheld the shameful laws that ex-
cluded and deported Chinese laborers.I9 Futhermore, they were 
based on a rationale, grounded in international law doctrine, that 
seems wholly inadequate to explain the modern immigration power. 
The early cases connected the immigration power with the foreign 
affairs power, viewing border regulations as necessary to protect the 
U.S. from the actions of foreign nations and masses of foreigners.2o 
Some regulations of immigration may well be closely tied to the 
foreign policy of the United States; President Carter's order denying 
entry to Iranian nationals during the hostage crisis is an obvious 
example. But the vast bulk of the immigration code has little to do 
with foreign policy. Consider, for instance, provisions that create 
preferences for close family members, exclude persons with conta-
gious diseases, or deport aliens who commit serious crimes.21 
While "foreign policy" has provided a convenient excuse, it 
hardly seems to capture the deep structure of our thinking about 
immigration and the Constitution. This underlying structure is bet-
ter explained by the model of citizenship-as-membership. In devel-
oping the model-perhaps at too great a length-it may appear that 
I am defending it. I am not. Rather, I am attempting to uncover, 
and cast in the best light, a set of assumptions that inform (or, per-
haps, drive) constitutional doctrine. 
Understanding citizenship as membership is deeply ingrained 
in constitutional thinking. In 1875, Chief Justice Waite wrote for 
the Court: "[Citizenship] convey[s] the idea of membership of a 
nation, and nothing more. There cannot be a nation without a peo-
ple."22 Four score years later, in a case holding that citizenship 
could not be lost without the consent of the citizen, Justice Black 
exclaimed: "[The] citizenry is the country and the country is its 
citizenry. "23 
Citizenship suggests more than mere national identification. 
At least since the American and French Revolutions, citizenship 
has defined the locus of sovereignty in a democratic nation. While 
not all citizens exercise sovereign power, only citizens have a re-
spectable claim to the right to vote or rule. Indeed, most Ameri-
19. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (Chinese Exclusion Case); 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
20. See Aleinikotf, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 862 (1989). 
21. See Legomsky, supra note I, at 261-69. 
22. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165, 166 (1874). The "nothing more" 
is used here by the Court to explain why excluding women-who clearly were citizens-from 
voting did not violate the clause of the fourteenth amendment that prohibits states from 
abridging the "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." 
23. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967). 
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cans would probably recognize the possession of political rights as 
the most significant difference between aliens and citizens. Justice 
Byron White's destined-to-be-a-classic paragraph in Cabell v. Cha-
vez-Salido, a case upholding a state requirement that probation of-
ficers be citizens, states this understanding of citizenship in bold 
terms: 
The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is not a deficiency in 
the democratic system but a necessary consequence of the community's process of 
political self-definition. Self-government, whether direct or through representatives, 
begins by defining the scope of the community of the governed and thus of the 
governors as well: Aliens are by definition those outside of this community.24 
Citizenship is not simply a recognition that one is a part of a 
self-identifying group (like an ethnic or religious group). It is mem-
bership in a national community--one that asserts the power to rule 
over a geographical area and the people residing therein.2s It is 
here that the link between citizenship and the Constitution becomes 
understandable. Because we generally view the Constitution as es-
tablishing our national community, it seems reasonable to under-
stand the document as primarily concerned with the members of 
the national community, that is, citizens. (I will argue below that 
this does not logically follow.) This link is made explicit in the oath 
required of new citizens. To obtain naturalization, an alien does not 
pledge allegiance to the American people or to the land mass of the 
United States. Rather, she must promise to "support and defend 
the Constitution" and "to bear true faith and allegiance to the 
same."26 Becoming a citizen means joining a national political asso-
ciation--one founded by, dedicated to, and united around the 
Constitution. 
A nation is organized in order to act on behalf of, and in the 
interests of, its members. It is self-consciously instrumental, as the 
Preamble to the Constitution makes clear ("in order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, pro-
vide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and se-
cure the Blessings of Liberty"). To quote Chief Justice Waite again, 
"The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies 
an association of persons for the promotion of their general wel-
fare."27 The crucial word in this quotation is "their"; it reminds us 
24. 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982) (emphasis supplied). 
25. Citizenship carries other "rights," such as the ability to obtain a U.S. passport and 
protection against the acts of foreign states. Perhaps the most important implication of citi-
zenship--and one that, surprisingly, is rarely thought about-is that citizens cannot be de-
ported from the United States. 
26. Immigration and Nationality Act § 337(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1982). 
27. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165-66 (1874). 
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that nations are not eleemosynary associations established for the 
benefit of non-members. The concept of national membership is 
thus doubly exclusive. It designates non-members by defining 
members. It also recognizes an association that is expected to exer-
cise power in the interests of members with less concern for the 
interests of non-members. 
Citizenship-as-membership might at first glance seem inconsis-
tent with the premises of liberal democracy. What, after all, justi-
fies those living in a society (largely by accident of birth) denying 
entrance or "equal concern and respect" to other human beings?2s 
Liberal defenses of restricted admission can be made when the num-
bers get scary enough;29 but, at least for the last century, American 
immigration laws have been far more restrictive than necessary to 
ensure the survival of the state. Similarly, laws excluding perma-
nent resident aliens from political participation or government ben-
efits are dramatically over- and under-inclusive if they are justified 
in terms of loyalty, competence, or identification with "American 
values." Alienage, in these situations, appears not to be a proxy for 
any other characteristic, but rather seems to provide a difference by 
definition. One would expect a liberal democracy to demand func-
tional, not definitional, differences before denying persons opportu-
nities and benefits. 
The explanation, I believe, can be traced to the underlying 
political theory of a liberal democracy: the notion of popular sover-
eignty. In a monarchy, sovereignty (in the form of the King or 
Queen) is external to the subject and alien alike. In a sense, every 
alien and every citizen faces the sovereign on a one-to-one basis. 
But in a democracy, sovereignty is something shared by citizens and 
citizens alone. Without a notion of citizenship, sovereignty has no 
home. This is what makes Justice White's assertion in Cabell so 
compelling: "Self-government ... begins by defining the scope of 
the community of the governed and thus of the governors as well: 
Aliens are by definition those outside of this community."3° White 
does not mean that aliens are not "governed" when they reside 
here; of course they are subject to our laws. He means that a polit-
ical system in which the people rule must begin with a concept of 
The People. The Constitution starts precisely that way; and in so 
28. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 89-95 (1980). 
See also Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. I (1984), 
which attempts to ground "classical immigration law" in nineteenth century liberalism but 
seems to concede that "restrictive nationalism" may be a better description than "traditional 
liberalism." 
29. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 28, at 93-95. 
30. 454 U.S. at 439-40 (emphasis supplied). 
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doing, it defines outsiders. Citizenship-as-full-membership is not 
the rock upon which liberal democracy founders, but rather the 
rock upon which is is founded. 
Immigration and naturalization law reflect this model of citi-
zenship-as-membership. From the perspective of citizenship-as-
membership, immigration decisions are membership decisions, and 
the immigration system is a process for selecting and evaluating 
candidates for membership. 
Immigration law serves both as a quantitative and qualitative 
screen. Immigrants (other than immediate relatives of U.S. citi-
zens) are subject to an annual numerical limitation. Aliens are also 
denied entry if they possess any of the undesirable traits identified in 
the numerous exclusion provisions in the immigration code. Most 
important, the system does not function as a lottery or admit aliens 
on a first-come-first-served-basis.3I An alien must either have a 
close family relative in the United States or a job offer that cannot 
be filled by a qualified U.S. worker.32 Thus, our immigration laws 
operate to identify aliens who are likely to "fit in."33 
Naturalization, in this scheme, bestows full membership. Per-
manent resident aliens may naturalize on fairly easy terms after liv-
ing in the United States for five years, a period that citizenship-as-
membership views as probationary. During this period, both the 
alien and the nation consider whether a long term relationship 
31. Congress has recently provided lottery-type admission programs on a temporary 
basis. Section 314(a) of the Immigration Control and Reform Act authorized the entry of ten 
thousand aliens over two years from countries adversely affected by the 1965 legislation that 
established the preference system. (Restoring opportunities for Irish immigration was a 
prime concern for several leading supporters of the provision.) The provision was extended 
for an additional two years and the number of visas raised to fifteen thousand per year. Pub. 
L. No. 100-658, § 2, 102 Stat. 3908 (1988), codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988)). 
In 1988, Congress established a lottery for the distribution of twenty thousand immigrant 
visas over two years to aliens from countries that in fiscal year 1988 used less than twenty-five 
percent of the maximum number of immigrant visas available to them. id. § 3. This latter 
program represents a significant departure from the family reunification goals that largely 
drive the current immigration system. Whether such "diversity" lotteries become a perma-
nent feature of admissions policy remains to be seen. 
32. The immigration code theoretically authorizes the entry of "non-preference" aliens, 
but only if the family and work preferences do not use up the visas allocated each year. No 
non-preference visas have been available since 1978. (See the discussion in note 31 of recent 
legislation creating temporary programs for the entrance of aliens outside the preference sys-
tem.) PropoSals pending in Congress would establish a preference for "independent" aliens-
i.e., those without a close family member or job in the U.S.-and visas would be granted on 
the basis of a point system that would assign a certain number of points for desirable traits 
(e.g., age, education, and occupational skills). The point system, should it be adopted, would 
represent the apotheosis of a method for identifying aliens likely to be beneficial to the U.S. 
33. Refugees, it may be argued, constitute an exception to this generalization. Ameri-
can refugee programs, however, have been heavily tilted towards aliens leaving Communist 
nations, and generous public and private programs help refugees adjust to life in the United 
States. 
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would be appropriate; the alien remains free to go home and the 
government has the constitutional power to deport her. Successful 
completion of the probationary period entitles her to full member-
ship. This probationary model is common enough in our society. 
To academics, the tenure process may spring to mind; to lawyers, 
partnership may seem the relevant analogy. Like citizenship, both 
tenure and partnership represent full membership in a community, 
and such membership carries with it the right to control the institu-
tion and to vote on the membership rules. 
Although federal law does not require that resident aliens ap-
ply for naturalization, citizenship is clearly the intended end of the 
immigration process.J4 Given the predominant American view that 
most foreigners would acquire U.S. citizenship if they could, resi-
dent aliens who choose not to naturalize are subject to criticism or 
suspicion.35 
Justice Jackson's majority opinion in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy 
illustrates this conception of immigration law. The case rejected 
various constitutional challenges to a federal law ordering the de-
portation of aliens who had been former members of the Commu-
nist Party. Jackson began his constitutional analysis with the 
following observations: 
For over thirty years each of these aliens has enjoyed such advantages as ac-
crue from residence here without renouncing his foreign allegiance or formally ac-
knowledging adherence to the Constitution he now invokes. Each was admitted to 
the United States, upon passing formidable exclusionary hurdles, in the hope that, 
after what may be called a probationary period, he would desire and be found desir-
able for citizenship. 36 
Apparently the failure of the aliens to naturalize meant that the 
immigration process had malfunctioned. By choosing not to be-
come full members, the aliens had in effect placed a brand on 
themselves.37 
Suspiciousness towards aliens who choose not to naturalize 
continues today. Senator Alan Simpson, perhaps Congress's lead-
ing figure on immigration matters, has argued that "the desire to 
34. And there are significant incentives to naturalize. Naturalized aliens have an easier 
time sponsoring the entry of close family members, are not subject for deportation grounds, 
and are entitled to vote, hold political office and travel on a U.S. passport. 
35. Or, as Robert Post has suggested to me, an alien who refuses to take advantage of 
opportunities to naturalize puts the nation in the position of a spumed lover. 
36. 342 u.s. 580, 585 (1952). 
37. Jackson also noted the "advantages" enjoyed by a non-naturalized alien residing in 
the U.S.: "The alien retains immunities from burdens which the citizen must shoulder. By 
withholding his allegiance from the United States, he leaves outstanding a foreign call on his 
loyalties which international law not only permits our Government to recognize but com-
mands it to respect." /d. at 585-86. 
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assimilate is often reflected by the rate at which an immigrant com-
pletes the naturalization process." He therefore finds distressing 
that the naturalization rates of immigrants from Mexico and South 
America are considerably lower than those of European and Asian 
immigrants.Js The point here is not that we should attach the sig-
nificance to naturalization rates that Senator Simpson does. In fact, 
I doubt that we should. Rather, it is to notice the strength of the 
model of immigration as the first step of a process that ends in citi-
zenship. Aliens who get off that track are considered either un-
grateful or subversive-that is, "not our kind." 
The constitutional norms applied to exercises of the federal im-
migration power are a natural product of citizenship-as-member-
ship thinking. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the treatment 
of aliens seeking initial entry to the United States-persons whom 
the model comfortably views as prototypical non-members. The 
Court states as a truism that an alien can have no constitutional 
right to enter.39 Congress is free to grant or withhold the "privi-
lege" of entering the United States on whatever basis it deems ap-
propriate, and it has unconstrained authority to craft procedures for 
determining admissibility. In words chillingly reminiscent of the 
Court's most infamous designation of non-membership in Dred 
Scott,#) the Eleventh Circuit has declared: "Aliens seeking admis-
sion ... have no constitutional rights with regard to their applica-
tions and must be content to accept whatever statutory rights and 
privileges they are granted by Congress.4I 
Under citizenship-as-membership, merely achieving entry 
ought not to significantly alter the status of the non-member. Be-
cause the resident alien is simply a "guest," the host is free to re-
voke the invitation at will. Thus, the Court has shown almost no 
inclination to rethink nineteenth century doctrine giving Congress 
virtually unrestrained authority over deportation. Deportation 
grounds may have retrospective effect, applying to conduct which 
was not condemned at the time of entry; and they may be applied to 
resident aliens no matter how long they have lived in the United 
States or how long ago the offending conduct occurred. According 
to long-standing doctrine, deportation is "simply a refusal by the 
38. U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: The Final Report and Recom· 
mend at ions of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 
(1981) (Statement of U.S. Senator Allen K. Simpson), quoted in T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MAR-
TIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 122-23 (1985). 
39. E.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). 
40. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
41. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 968 (lith Cir. 1984) (en bane), a./f'd, 472 U.S. 846 
(1985). 
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Government to harbor persons whom it does not want. "42 Simi-
larly, the Court has held that Congress has nearly unreviewable 
power to disqualify resident aliens from federal benefits and oppor-
tunities. The Court views such statutes as regulations of immigra-
tion (i.e., defining the conditions of entry and residence), and 
therefore subjects them to only the scantest scrutiny.43 
Constitutional law does not push the logic of citizenship-as-
membership to its limits. It has never adopted the view that, as 
non-members, aliens are wholly beyond the purview of the Consti-
tution. Outside the immigration context, aliens present in this 
country-whether or not they are in lawful status-are entitled to 
most of the constitutional protections afforded U.S. citizens. Aliens 
arrested for crimes in the United States receive the benefits of the 
fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments. The equal protection 
clause has been read to prohibit the states from denying resident 
aliens public benefits and opportunities, except those identified with 
the exercise of the sovereign power of the state. And in stark con-
trast to the absence of due process rights for initial entrants, the 
Court has been willing to scrutinize deportation procedures for 
aliens within the United States as well as aliens granted resident 
status who have left the United States and are stopped at the border 
seeking to return. 
The Court's immigration decisions have not attempted to de-
velop a coherent theory of membership that can explain both con-
gressional "plenary power" and the possession of constitutional 
rights by resident aliens. Citizenship-as-membership might try to 
account for the latter by portraying immigration as a process of 
growing attachment44 to the United States: resident aliens may be 
entitled to protections not extended to aliens seeking initial entry 
but may not enjoy all the rights that flow from citizenship.45 To 
42. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913). See Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). 
43. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (permanent resident aliens must 
reside in the U.S. for five years to be eligible for part B of Medicare). The Court appears 
determined to analyze all congressional classifications based on alienage as regulations of 
immigration. As Gerald Rosberg has argued, there may well be a difference. Rosberg, The 
Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SuP. 
CT. REV. 275, 334-39. Consider, for example, how one ought to characterize a congressional 
statute disqualifying aliens from welfare and medicaid benefits that is justified solely in terms 
of reducing the federal deficit. 
44. Supreme Court opinions reflect this model of progressing levels of membership. 
See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) ("Congress may decide that as the alien's 
tie grows stronger, so does the strength of his claim to an equal share of [the government's) 
munificence"); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) ("The alien ... has been 
accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our 
society"). 
45. For a detailed discussion of levels of membership, see Martin, supra note I. 
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return to the analogies of tenure and partnership suggested earlier, 
holding an untenured appointment on a faculty or serving as an 
associate in a law firm counts for something. Even if there is no 
guarantee of accession to full membership, certainly the time spent 
at the institution puts an untenured teacher or an associate in a 
situation quite distinct from a person outside, or seeking to be hired 
by, the institution. 
The international law doctrines that supplied the basis for the 
nineteenth century "plenary power" cases also recognized that 
aliens, once admitted, were entitled to protections normally af-
forded citizens of the admitting state. 46 Similar understandings per-
vade the common law. Duties of care toward guests are imposed 
upon landowners even though landowners have broad authority to 
choose their guests and to require guests to leave. Just as imposi-
tion of obligations on a host does not change the status of a guest, so 
too citizenship-as-membership can recognize duties of care toward 
resident aliens without thereby transforming them into full 
members. 
Citizenship-as-membership therefore can incorporate the ex-
tension of constitutional protections to resident aliens outside the 
immigration context. But the kinds of arguments just suggested fail 
to explain why constitutional norms do not also apply to regula-
tions of immigration that burden resident aliens. That is, why does 
the first amendment prohibit the imprisonment of resident aliens for 
protected speech but not prevent their deportation for such speech? 
Ultimately, it appears that the two lines of cases are not part of a 
coherent whole, but rather reflect conflicting strands in our consti-
tutionalism: one concerned with affirming the importance of mem-
bership in a national community; the other pursuing a notion of 
fundamental human rights that protects individuals regardless of 
their status.47 I will argue below that the cases recognizing consti-
tutional protections for aliens outside the immigration context pro-
vide critical purchase for reorienting the Court's current model of 
membership. 
I have tried to show that citizenship-as-membership provides a 
theoretical structure that seems to underlie the Court's recognition 
of wide-ranging congressional authority to regulate immigration. 
This is hardly to suggest that Congress has pushed its power to an 
anti-alien extreme. Approximately half a million aliens are admit-
ted each year for permanent residence. Permanently residing aliens 
46. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 692, 708 (1893), quoting I T. ORTO-
LAN, REGLES INTERNATIONALES 0IPLOMATIE DE LA MER 297 (4th ed. 1864). 
47. See Aleinikoff, supra note 20. 
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are entitled to most federal benefits, are protected against discrimi-
nation, and can naturalize on easy terms. (Such generosity may be 
based in large part on Congress's ability to limit entry and therefore 
limit the costs of benevolence.) The important point, however, is 
not how good a host Congress has been, but rather that it (and we) 
tend to adopt the "host" metaphor. Citizenship-as-membership, by 
making congressional admission policies acts of beneficence, renders 
congressional niggardliness theoretically untroubling. Moreover, if 
nothing is required to be given, then the host who does give is seen 
as generous. We can take pride in our immigration policies not 
only for their contribution to the national welfare but also for the 
image it allows us to hold of ourselves. 
II 
It would not be particularly difficult, as a practical matter, to 
bring the Constitution to bear on immigration regulations. As com-
mentators have repeatedly shown, the nation would hardly lose its 
ability to control the borders or to prevent subversion if modern 
constitutional conceptualizations of due process, equal protection, 
and fundamental rights were deemed to constrain exercises of the 
immigration power.4s The reason these academic appeals have 
failed, it seems to me, is that they have been directed at the wrong 
level of analysis. Proposals for reform must come to grips with the 
underlying premises of our constitutional thinking about the immi-
gration power. This could be accomplished in two ways. We could 
either work within the existing links among the immigration power, 
membership, and the Constitution; or we could unlink immigration 
and membership by reconceptualizing the immigration power. The 
concluding section of this essay will attempt the latter. I will argue 
in this section that if we are serious that "membership in the na-
tional community" should be a guiding principle in developing con-
stitutional doctrine, then we should broaden the category of 
"members" to include permanently residing aliens. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist has argued that "the Constitution it-
self recognizes a basic difference between citizens and aliens." That 
distinction, he asserts, "is constitutionally important in no less than 
11 instances in a political document noted for its brevity."49 Rehn-
quist relies on these data in concluding that classifications based on 
48. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 20; Legomsky, supra note I; Martin, supra note I. 
49. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 651 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See 
Perry, Equal Protection. Judicial Activism. and the Intellectual Agenda of Constitutional The-
ory: Reflections On, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 329, 334 (1983) (framers 
"seem to have" "embodied in the Constitution the judgment that citizens and aliens are mor-
ally different and therefore may be treated differently"). But see A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY 
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alienage are not "suspect" (and thus should not be subjected to 
"strict scrutiny"). But of course the textual references to 
citizenship can be read two ways. Either the framers thought that 
their Constitution was really about citizens and therefore constantly 
reminded us of that; or they thought their document was primarily 
about persons, and therefore mentioned citizens in particular situa-
tions as a special case. Current membership theory is closer to the 
first approach, consigning aliens to outsiderness. But much can be 
said for the latter. 
The Bill of Rights seems to consciously avoid using the word 
"citizen."so In places where "citizen" or "citizens" could have been 
used, the amendments adopt terms like "person" or "the accused." 
Frequently the beneficiary of the provision is simply not identified 
("Congress shall make no law ... "; "Excessive bail shall not be 
required ... nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"). The 
phrase "the people" does occur a number of times, and could be 
understood to mean "citizens" -particularly given the first three 
words of the Preamble. But it has never been suggested, nor has the 
Court ever held, that such enumerated rights apply only to citizens. 
For example, the fourth amendment states that "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers . . . shall not be 
violated." Yet is is well-established that aliens (even aliens who 
enter unlawfully) are entitled to fourth amendment protection.s 1 
Perhaps most dramatic is section one of the fourteenth amendment. 
It begins with a definition of citizenship, yet subsequent clauses 
pointedly provide protection to "persons."sz Aliens also figure in 
other important provisions of the Constitution. Apportionment of 
representatives is based on the "whole number of persons"-a for-
mulation that has forever been understood to include aliens. The 
definitions of the military and taxing powers conspicuously avoid 
limiting Congress' authority to burden noncitizens. Not surpris-
ingly, draft and taxation measures (with certain exceptions) have 
OF CoNSENT 33 (1975) ("Remarkably enough ... the concept of citizenship plays only the 
most minimal role in the American constitutional scheme.") 
50. See Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity, 84 
MICH. L. REV. 1504, 1508-09 (1986). 
51. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
52. The fourteenth amendment was adopted against a backdrop of decades of discrimi-
nation against Chinese aliens living on the West Coast, and the 1870 Civil Rights Act was 
clearly intended to protect the Chinese. See McClain, The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in 
Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CAL. L. REv. 529 (1984). 
A notable exception to the general point here is the privileges or immunities clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. However, as John Ely has suggested, the clause could be read to offer 
protection to aliens if one understands "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States" as a bundle of rights held by all persons, rather than as a designation of the benefi-
ciaries. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 24-25 (1981). 
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regularly applied to resident aliens. Non-enumerated rights too-
such as the "right of privacy" -have never been limited to citizens. 
When the Court identifies such rights, it simply seems to assume 
that they apply to all persons within the territorial limits of the 
United States. 
When read in this manner, the Constitution reflects quite a dif-
ferent theory of membership. Rather than seeing citizens as the 
general case and aliens as the special case (the outsider), we can 
understand the document as being primarily about "persons" -a 
category that includes aliens and citizens as subsets. 
This is not to deny that the Constitution treats citizens as spe-
cial for some purposes. If citizenship plays any coherent role in our 
constitutional scheme, it is to designate the holders of certain polit-
ical rights. The president and members of Congress must be citi-
zens; and only citizens are protected in the amendments extending 
the franchise. But nothing necessarily makes possession of the 
franchise a test of membership. For most of our constitutional his-
tory large groups of citizens have been denied the right to vote. 
Moreover, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, aliens were 
allowed to vote in a number of states.s3 Of course, our polity now 
operates on the principles of universal (citizen) suffrage; and it is 
probably fair to say that today we view possession of political rights 
as the central significance of citizenship. But definition of a special 
subset of electors and elected does not entail that persons outside 
the subset are non-members. That is, one can understand constitu-
tional membership as extending to all persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United Statess4 even if the document privileges 
citizenship in certain respects. 
Flipping our structural understanding of the Constitution be-
gins to put some things in perspective. It provides a firm base for 
the current understanding that the Bill of Rights applies to resident 
aliens. It also helps us understand an aspect of our constitutional 
tradition. For more than a hundred years it has been accepted that 
children born here to aliens (even undocumented aliens) in the 
United States are citizens of the United States. Such a conclusion 
may not be surprising given the words of the fourteenth amend-
53. See Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote, 75 MICH. L. 
REV. 1092 (1977). 
54. This is somewhat of a hedge, because one could understand "within the jurisdic-
tion" of the United States as meaning either within the physical boundaries of the United 
States of America or subject to the power of the government of the United States, whether 
inside or outside the national boundaries. I am concerned at present only with aliens physi-
cally within the United States and leave for another day discussion of whether "the Constitu-
tion follows the flag." 
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ment.ss But it seems difficult to square with an understanding of 
citizenship as full membership because it gives aliens the power to 
"create" members. 
Citizenship-as-membership is also simply out of touch with the 
current reality of the immigration process. If citizenship constitutes 
full membership, then the theory should predict a naturalization 
process that carefully screens candidates acceding to the inner cir-
cle. (Consider how much more seriously many faculties and law 
firms take tenure and partnership decisions in comparison to initial 
hiring.) In actual practice, however, the immigration system makes 
its most careful membership decision at the time of entry, not at 
naturalization. Gaining admission to the United States is extraordi-
narily difficult. Numerical quotas and detailed grounds of exclusion 
disqualify the vast majority of the world's population from entering 
the United States. But for aliens who attain admission and seek 
citizenship, naturalization is usually a matter of course. 
Furthermore, permanently residing aliens live and function 
much as citizens. They hold jobs, attend churches, send their chil-
dren to school, and pay taxes. Children they give birth to here are 
United States citizens. From this perspective, the fact that aliens 
are not required by law to apply for citizenship is not surprising; in 
day-to-day terms, permanently residing aliens and citizens are al-
ready virtually indistinguishable. 
Thus, both immigration practice and the daily lives of resident 
aliens suggest that true "membership" in the life of the nation be-
gins at the point of admission for permanent residence.s6 And the 
Court, in its better moments, seems to recognize this. 
In Graham v. Sugarman,s7 the Court struck down statutes that 
excluded permanent resident aliens from state welfare programs. 
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion found the state laws doubly 
bad. By effectively denying aliens "entrance and abode," the state 
laws conflicted with federal immigration policy. This holding is at 
home in membership theory: the states cannot upset the terms of 
the federal government's invitation. The second ground of decision, 
however, ran quite counter to citizenship-as-membership. Justice 
Blackmun, with virtually no analysis, designated aliens "a discrete 
55. But see P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL 
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985) (arguing that fourteenth amendment need not be 
read to grant citizenship to children born to aliens). 
56. See Rosberg, supra note 43, at 337 (identifying as "the traditional premise of the 
country's immigration policy" recognition that "resident aliens are virtually full-fledged 
members of the American community, sharing the burdens of membership as well as the 
benefits"). 
57. 403 u.s. 365 (1971). 
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and insular minority," thereby triggering strict scrutiny of laws that 
discriminate against them. Labelling aliens "discrete and insular" 
is an effective way, under prevailing equal protection analysis, to 
invalidate unfriendly laws. But Justice Blackmun's invocation of 
the phrase glides too readily past serious analytical difficulties.ss 
The last paragraph of his discussion of the equal protection 
claim, however, seems to take a different turn, one that seems to 
recognize admission for permanent residence as establishing 
membership: 
We agree with the three-judge court ... that the "justification of limiting ex-
penses is particularly inappropriate and unreasonable when the discriminated class 
consists of aliens. Aliens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed 
forces .... [A]liens may live within a state for many years, work in the state and 
contribute to the economic growth of the state." There can be no "special public 
interest" Oustifying exclusion of aliens from state programs] in tax revenues to 
which aliens have contributed on an equal basis with the residents [sic.] of the 
State.59 
Although Blackmun does not appear to recognize the tension this 
paragraph creates for his opinion, in these lines he actually flips the 
justification for invalidating discriminatory state laws. The statutes 
in Graham should be invalidated not because aliens are a defense-
less group needing judicial protection, but rather because-at least 
from the state's perspective-they are indistinguishable from other 
residents of the state. State laws excluding aliens from opportuni-
ties should be seen as no more legitimate than laws excluding red-
heads. Both would be invalid, not because such groups are 
downtrodden but because the state can offer no legitimate reason 
for singling them out. 
Perhaps the most dramatic example of this expanding concept 
of membership is a case invalidating a Texas statute that authorized 
58. The phrase originated, of course, in the famous footnote four of the Caro/ene Prod-
ucts case. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). In the third paragraph of the footnote, Justice 
Stone suggested that "more searching judicial inquiry" might be appropriate in cases evidenc-
ing "prejudice ... which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political process 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." This justification, however, does not eas-
ily translate into protection for aliens, who, after all, may constitutionally be excluded from 
voting and office holding. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. I, 39-42 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). To be sure, discrimination against aliens has a persistent and ugly history in this 
country; but generally such hatred has been based on racial or ethnic backgrounds, not the 
fact of "alienage." Aliens, as a class, are remarkably diverse and not particularly "insular." 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1976) ("[T]he class of aliens is ... a heterogeneous 
multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of ties to this country.") To a surprising 
degree, aliens participate in American life on equal terms with U.S. citizens. Moreover, they 
are often able to find allies in the political system eager to represent their interests. (The 
legalization program adopted in 1986 for long-term undocumented aliens is only the most 
recent example.) 
59. 403 U.S. at 376 (citations omitted). 
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local school districts to exclude the children of undocumented 
aliens from public schools. In Plyler v. Doe, the Court specifically 
resisted (as it had before) labelling education a "fundamental 
right"; rather, its analysis was grounded in the recognition that un-
documented children were likely to be permanent members of 
American society: 
This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident 
aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but neverthe-
less denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful 
residents. 
By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within 
the structure uf our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they 
will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation. 
[T]he record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by this clas-
sification will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful 
residents or citizens of the United States. It is difficult to understand precisely what 
the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass 
of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of un-
employment, welfare, and crime. It is thus clear that whatever savings might be 
achieved by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in 
light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation. 60 
Although other factors appear to have carried weight in the major-
ity opinion (including the fundamental importance of education and 
the unfairness of injuring children because of their parents' viola-
tion of the immigration laws), Peter Schuck is clearly correct that 
Plyler "may mark a fundamental break with classical immigration 
law's concept of national community and of the scope of congres-
sional power to decide who is entitled to the benefits of 
membership. "6t 
Shifting our definition of membership is not guaranteed to pro-
duce determinative results. It is, however, likely to influence our 
evaluation of possible constitutional arguments by making certain 
considerations more or less relevant or by making certain existing 
or argued-for doctrinal lines appear more or less arbitrary.62 Con-
60. 457 u.s. 202, 218-19, 223, 230 (1982). 
61. Schuck, supra note 28, at 54. 
Other cases suggest a broader definition of membership in the immigration context. See. 
e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (applying due process protection at the 
border for returning resident aliens based on recognition that "once an alien gains admission 
to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitu-
tional status changes accordingly"); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Fong 
Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (narrowly construing deportation statute because 
"deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile"). 
62. The discussion so far might seem a curious form of constitutional argument. So let 
me be clear about it. The central issue I am investigating is the intellectual frame of mind 
with which we approach constitutional questions regarding regulations of aliens. My claim is 
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sider, for example, the current constitutional doctrine that permits 
the deportation of long-term permanent resident aliens. Under citi-
zenship-as-membership, because such aliens have not become full 
members, their insecurity in the United States is not troubling. Ex-
panding our definition of membership makes this mode of analysis 
less persuasive. Viewing resident aliens as members would make us 
wonder why we would be willing to deport them when we do not 
deport citizens. It allows us to see deportation, not as a self-in-
flicted wound ("you chose not to naturalize"), but as punishment 
(the same way we would understand the "banishment" of a 
citizen).63 
A broader conception of membership would also raise ques-
tions about the current preference system, which establishes quotas 
for the immediate relatives of permanent resident aliens but not for 
those of U.S. citizens.64 It would also cast grave doubt on the de-
portation of aliens for activities protected by the first amendment.6s 
Similarly suspect would be government programs that provide ben-
efits and opportunities only to citizens. 
These statements are carefully hedged because, again, the as-
sertion is not that membership theory automatically translates into 
that something other than the force of logic or precedent explains why the consitutional 
doctrine in this area has been so immune to persistent and powerful demands for reform. We 
come at constitutional questions with an assortment of understandings about our constitu-
tional system, the role of courts, and notions of democracy and constitutionalism. These are 
readings of a broader text-a social text-in which constitutional law is situated. Although 
not usually seen as the "stuff" of constitutional argument, every good constitutional advocate 
appeals to these understandings by formulating doctrinal claims consistent with them. The 
understandings are sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, and often contested. My sugges-
tion, that we expand our understanding of membership to include permanently residing 
aliens, is not defended in traditional constitutional argumentative form-although I have 
used cases and the structure of the Constitution as support. Rather, it is an attempt to alter 
the intellectual filters through which we run our constitutional arguments. 
63. This doesn't provide an answer to the constitutional question. The fact that an 
alien almost always has a country to return to may make us view the degree of harm inflicted 
by deportation as quite different from that imposed on a banished citizen (who may end up as 
a "person without a country"). 
64. See Guendelsberger, Implementing Family Unification Rights in American Immi-
gration Law: Proposed Amendments, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 253 (1988). 
65. Happily, Congress has enacted a temporary suspension of such deportation grounds 
for non-immigrant aliens, effective through 1990. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. 
L. No. 100-204, § 901 (1987), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-461, 101 Stat. 2768 (1988): 
"[N]o non-immigrant alien may be ... excluded from admission into the United States, 
subject to restriction or conditions on entry into the United States, or subject to deportation 
because of any past, current, or expected beliefs, statement, or associations which, if engaged 
in by a United States citizen in the United States. would be protected under the Constitution 
of the United States." Furthermore, a federal district court has recently invalidated a depor-
tation ground mandating the removal of aliens who teach or advocate "world communism." 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
The government has announced it will appeal the decision. The case, therefore, could serve 
as an important vehicle for rethinking constitutional limits on the immigration power. 
1990] CITIZENSHIP 27 
constitutional doctrine. Altering our understanding of membership 
would only serve to open up these issues by removing the easy 
thought-blocking, definitional weight that the citizenship-as-mem-
bership perspective throws up against constitutional questions.66 
Ill 
What can be said against this broader theory of membership? 
The Court's concern seems to be that if we slide the membership 
line we will sap citizenship of any significance. The Court has justi-
fied exclusion of aliens from state political positions in part on the 
ground that it is important that we not " 'obliterate all the distinc-
tions between citizens and aliens, and thus deprecate the historic 
value of citizenship.' "67 This justification may reflect deeply held 
intuitions. Consider the following comment taken from a student 
66. A number of readers of this essay have wondered whether my argument means that 
an open border is constitutionally required. I think not. While expanding our conception of 
membership may put pressure on some aspects of the current preference system, see TAN 66, 
it would hardly invalidate all border regulations adopted in pursuit of national security and 
welfare. For a reformulation of due process requirements at the border, see, Aleinikoff, 
Aliens. Due Process and "Community Ties": A Response to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237 
(1983). 
The treatment of undocumented aliens residing in the U.S. is a tougher question, and 
will not be fully addressed here. While the Supreme Court has stated that "undocumented 
status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative goal," Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 
(1982), the Court has generally assumed that undocumented aliens residing in the U.S. are 
entitled to basic constitutional protection. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U.S. 266 (1973) (fourth amendment); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1986) (fifth 
and sixth amendments). And plausible arguments can be made that the fact of domicile, not 
the lawfulness of residence, ought to be the issue in determining the constitutionality of state 
laws discriminating against aliens. See Rosberg, Discrimination Against the "Nonresident" 
Alien, 44 U. PITT L. REv. 399 (1983). Nothing I say in this essay should be read as casting 
doubt on the existence of congressional authority to adopt immigration regulations (although, 
of course, I advocate that the exercise of the immigration power should be subjected to con-
stitutional limits). If Congress chooses to regulate the border, aliens who enter in violation of 
the admission rules will be residing illegally in the United States. Accordingly, I do not think 
a strong claim can be made for equal treatment of lawful resident aliens and undocumented 
aliens (for instance, in terms of rights to family unification). At some point, however, un-
documented aliens may have lived here long enough to have developed substantial ties; in-
deed, their day-to-day existence may be quite similar to that of lawful resident aliens and 
citizens. See generally Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identify of the Un-
documented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 955. It may be sensible to 
assimilate the status of such long-term undocumented aliens to that of permanent resident 
aliens. This seems to be the motivating idea behind both § 244 of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (permitting the regularization of status of certain deportable aliens who have 
resided in the U.S. for seven years) and the legalization provisions of the 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act. 
67. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 
U.S. 291, 295 (1978)). Actually, as long as the deportation power exists, there remains a huge 
difference between aliens and citizens. While expanding our concept of constitutional mem-
bership may impose limits on the power to deport, we would have to travel a lot of ground to 
get rid of the deportation power altogether (particularly for grounds of illegal entry). 
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exam of several years ago: "Ever since reading Plyler v. Doe I have 
felt that there was something attractive about the argument that 
states should be able to deny benefits to aliens .... [Otherwise], 
what is the significance of citizenship?"6s 
As an initial matter, there is something distasteful-if not un-
constitutional69-about inflicting harm solely to make the non-af-
flicted feel special. More important, the desire to retain legal 
disabilities in order to preserve citizenship as a meaningful concept 
shows the bias of the lawyer. Citizenship, particularly for native-
born citizens, is an aspect of identity. Identification with one's 
homeland is organic, much as one's identification with one's ethnic-
ity or religion. Few of us choose our citizenship, yet for most of us 
it is an important part of how we define ourselves in the world. 
Extending constitutional membership will not threaten this differ-
ence between citizens and aliens. It is unlikely that a person born a 
U.S. citizen will feel any less an "American"7o because a Honduran 
in the United States is entitled to similar benefits and opportunities, 
nor is the Honduran likely to feel any less Honduran. Indeed, it is 
not inconceivable that someday we will understand citizenship 
as we do ethnicity and religion today-that is, as an important as-
pect of one's identity but not a characteristic that the government 
may normally take into account in exercising power over the 
individual.7' 
A second common defense of citizenship-as-membership is that 
it is important to emphasize and affirm a "national community" of, 
and for, Americans.72 Such a community may be valued for its fos-
tering of a common culture and political system. Seeing aliens as 
outsiders reaffirms (and helps define) what is inside. It also helps 
prevent a watering down of commonalities that might occur if 
membership is defined broadly. 
These kinds of claims have been pressed by scholars across the 
political spectrum. To conservatives, the project is one of assimila-
68. See also Schauer, supra note 50, at 1517 ("Investing citizenship with an importance 
it does not now possess might provide a comparatively benign outlet for the exclusionary 
impulses that seem inevitably to be a part of community bonding.!') 
69. Neither a "bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group," USDA v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), nor an irrational prejudice, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), is a legitimate governmental objective. 
70. The term "American" is used here to describe native born U.S. citizens. U.S. immi-
gration law needs new terminology because, as we sometimes forget, people born in countries 
from Canada to Argentina are "Americans." 
71. Citizenship would probably retain vitality in the international sphere so long as 
nation-states remain. 
72. See Schauer, supra note 50, at 1512 ("I want at least to consider the possibility that 
the notion of citizenship may help bind together those who are citizens, and that a stronger 
sense of citizenship, and a larger role for citizenship, may make those bonds stronger.") 
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tion: molding immigrants to the true American identity in order to 
preserve American traditions and institutions. To liberals, a 
"national community" is a liberating concept because it overcomes 
the irrational, tyrannical, constricting aspects of "tribal" loyalties. 
"Citizenship," representing membership in the national commu-
nity, is the ticket to universalism and equality; it rejects (or down-
plays) group identifications and allegiances that cut individuals off 
from the full range of opportunities in society.73 
In recent years, the idea of a "national community" has ap-
pealed to scholars critical of the liberal tradition. Liberalism has 
seemed inadequate on both descriptive and normative grounds. 
The "new communitarianism" rejects liberalism's description of 
human beings as "unencumbered" selves.74 "Most of us," writes 
David Martin, "were simply born into our most basic affiliations-
family, religion, nation. Those ties are not only objects of choice; to 
a significant extent they are constitutive of one's basic identity, ante-
rior to choice. "1s By stressing the social and historical bonds that 
connect members of a society, communitarianism makes a norma-
tive claim that institutions should nurture feelings of attachment 
that transcend personal self-interest. Pursuit of community goals 
will promote that which makes us most human (association with 
others) and will help overcome the anomie and alienation sympto-
matic of modem life. 
Recognizing that we cannot return to a lost golden age of small 
town life, communitarianism-like the conservative and liberal per-
spectives-sees great promise in the concept of a "national commu-
nity." It allows us to imagine an association of human beings who 
feel special obligations to one another.76 Once communitarianism 
reaches the national level, it readily turns to citizenship to demar-
cate the community. It seems to assume that, in a world of nation-
states, citizenship is the appropriate category for the fostering of 
"ties that bind. "77 
73. See generally R. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 153-88 (1953) (eighteenth 
and nineteenth century political theory saw idea of national community as promising salva-
tion from economic and moral misery and foundation for liberty, equality and fraternity). 
74. See Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 PoL. THEORY 
81 (1984). 
75. Martin, Membership and Consent: Abstract or Organic?, II YALE J. INT'L L. 278, 
292 (1985 (review of P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL 
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985)). 
76. See Martin, supra note I; Schauer, supra note 50; M. WALZER, SPHERES OF Jus-
TICE 31-61 (1983). 
77. Martin, supra note I, at 208. Part of the allure of citizenship is no doubt based on 
its association with political rights. Stressing political participation in a "national commu-
nity" is a way of ensuring that all persons share in communal self-determination. Thus, the 
communitarian perspective may favor easy terms of naturalization. Cf M. WALZER, supra 
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Despite the powerful attractions of the communitarian vision 
(a vision I share), the new communitarians get off track when they 
begin to talk about "citizenship as membership in a national com-
munity." It is too little noted that the phrase "national commu-
nity" is either an oxymoron or requires a substantial shift in our 
usual understanding of the term "community." "A community," 
writes Thomas Bender, "involves a limited number of people in a 
somewhat restricted social space or network held together by 
shared understandings and a sense of obligation. Relationships are 
close, often intimate, and usually face to face."1s This conception of 
"community" poorly describes the United States whose spacious-
ness and diversity are matters of national pride. It is just wishful 
thinking to suggest that most Americans feel the kinds of obliga-
tions to other Americans that we usually associate with "commu-
nity." The communitarians move too quickly to the metaphor of a 
"national community." They have confused Gemeinschaft with 
Gesellschaft. 79 
A communitarian might respond as follows. No one is sug-
gesting that we can replicate at the national level intimate feelings 
of community. What is wrong, however, with suggesting that mem-
bers of a state ought to be urged to put the interests of their fellow 
citizens and the nation ahead of the pursuit of their personal private 
interests? Did John Kennedy's "ask not ... "set too high a goal for 
a civilized polity? 
Certainly these are noble goals. But it is never explained why 
citizenship is the appropriate category for the development of a 
communitarian ethos. Why wouldn't we seek the formation of a 
sense of reciprocal obligations among all persons living and working 
within the territory of the United States? We know, as an empirical 
matter, that strong bonds between citizens and resident aliens exist. 
These ties, based on familial relationship, ethnicity, religion, race, 
note 76, at 52-61 ("No democratic state can tolerate the establishment of a fixed status be-
tween citizen and foreigner .... Men and women are either subject to the state's authority, or 
they are not; and if they are subject, they must be given a say, and ultimately an equal say, in 
what that authority does"). In this way, suggesting a primacy to citizenship may actually be 
a way to force the extension of rights, rather than simply a rationalization for the denial of 
rights. 
78. T. BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 7 (1978). 
79. See Bosniak, supra note 66, at 998-1006. This is not to deny a role for the federal 
government in fostering and supporting the creation of communities at a local level. John 
Dewey expressed this understanding of the relationship of the federal government to commu-
nity many years ago: "The Great Community, in the sense of free and full intercommunica-
tion, is conceivable. But it can never possess all the qualities which mark a local community. 
It will do its final work in ordering the relations and enriching the experience oflocal associa-
tions." J. DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 211 (1927). 
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or location may be far more powerful than those that can be fos-
tered among citizens who share nothing but American nationality. 
The claim here is not that Americans do not share "something 
in common" with one another. It is possible that there is "an 
American way of life," an American culture, that most or all Amer-
icans feel a part of. And it may even be sensible to talk of a national 
political philosophy-an "American Creed."so Moreover, the 
propagation of "Americanism"-whatever it means-may be ale-
gitimate or worthwhile governmental interest. Few would deny the 
value of being knowledgeable about the traditions and institutions 
of a country in which one resides. But the existence of commonali-
ties does not establish community (it would be odd to speak of peo-
ple who catch the same bus to work everyday as a community).s' 
More importantly, it is quite doubtful that "citizenship" is a useful 
category for sorting those who do and do not share an "American 
Creed." What makes America attractive to immigrants are pre-
cisely those values that Americans celebrate: liberty, equality, op-
portunity, government under law. Indeed, those who have chosen 
to join us-and to give up a less happy existence elsewhere-may 
well feel more committed to these values than those of us who hap-
pen to have been born here.s2 
Finally, the concept of a national community, by defining who 
belongs, also defines who does not belong and what one must be in 
order to belong. In a nation as diverse as the United States, the risk 
is great that a "national community" will not be all-inviting or all-
embracing.sJ Rather, it will reflect the norms and culture of domi-
nant groups.s4 Placing emphasis on membership, in such a world, 
80. S. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 14 
(1981): "What are the values of the American Creed? Innumerable studies have itemized 
them in various ways, but the same core political values appear in virtually all analyses: 
liberty, equality, individualism, democracy, and the rule of law under a constitution." 
81. As Kathleen Sullivan notes: "To be linked in a common fate is not the same as 
applying collective will to a common project." Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE 
L.J. 1713, 1721 (1988). To the extent that subgroups in the population adopt different inter-
pretations of the "American Creed," it is not even clear that such commonalities exist. For 
example, one might be able to talk about a societal norm of racial equality, but the affirmative 
action debate demonstrates that minority groups and white groups may hold different views 
of what the norm means. 
82. See Rosberg, supra note 43, at 315 ("As a test of affinity, an alienage classification is 
seriously over- and under-inclusive.") 
83. Recent academic interest in reviving "civic republicanism" has been criticized for 
its potentially coercive and exclusionary implications. See, e.g., Bell & Bansal, The Republi-
can Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609 (1988); Sullivan, supra note 81. 
84. We live in post-assimilationist days. As recent scholarship by feminists and people 
of color has made clear, dominant liberal discourse is neither neutral nor all-inclusive. See, 
e.g., D. BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED (1987); Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 
(1988); Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. 
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becomes a basis for excluding outsiders and compelling conformity 
from insiders. This certainly seems to be one lesson of the Court's 
alienage cases. As Justice White's opinion in Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido so graphically depicts, the concepts of "membership" and 
"national community" are used not to affirm commonly held values 
but to justify discrimination against outsiders.ss 
IV 
I have argued that the federal immigration power has been 
largely immune to serious constitutional scrutiny because of an un-
derlying set of assumptions that privileges membership, under-
stands immigration as a process of creating new members, and 
defines citizenship as full membership. And I have suggested that 
expanding the concept of membership to include permanently resid-
ing aliens would support the application of constitutional norms to 
immigration regulations.s6 But there may be another route to 
bringing the Constitution to bear on congressional regulation of 
aliens: reconceptualization of the immigration power. 
Immigration law exceptionalism has been defended over the 
years in grandiose but unsatisfying terms. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Court relied upon the concepts of "sovereignty" and "in-
herent power" to block constitutional review of immigration 
regulations. Control of the borders was seen as a necessary attri-
bute of nationhood and national security, protecting the United 
States from the acts of foreign powers who might send their people 
to overwhelm us.s7 In the twentieth century, judicial non-interven-
tion in immigration decisions has been justified by loose invocation 
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987); Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 
10 (1987); Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989). 
85. Concern about a constitutional conception of "membership in a national commu-
nity" is not an attack on the idea of nationhood per se. Interestingly, nationhood may be 
valued not for maintaining a national community, but for creating a space in which local or 
ethnic communities may survive. See, e.g., Miller, The Ethical Significance of Nationality, 98 
ETHICS 647, 659 (1988). 
86. Even the proposal just sketched-that the category of full member be expanded to 
include resident aliens-should give us pause. It still designates as non-members aliens seek-
ing initial entry to the United States. The Supreme court demonstrated the consequences of 
non-membership in Landon v. Plasencia, a case involving procedural due process rights of 
aliens in exclusion proceedings. The Court held that a permanent resident alien who left the 
country and sought to re-enter is entitled to the protection of the due process clause at the 
border. The alien seeking initial entry, however, "requests a privilege and has no constitu-
tional rights regarding his application." 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). 
87. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603, 604 (1889) (Chinese Exclusion 
Case) (power to exclude aliens is "an incident of every independent nation"; if nation could 
not control borders "it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power"). 
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of the "foreign affairs power"ss and the "political question" 
doctrine.s9 
Cognizant of the harsh rules that a Congress unconstrained by 
the Constitution is left free to adopt, recent scholarship has at-
tempted to defend immigration law exceptionalism in more palat-
able communitarian terms. Michael Walzer has argued that "[t]he 
distribution of membership is not pervasively subject to the con-
straints of justice" because "[a]t stake [in choosing an admissions 
policy] is the shape of the community": 
Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest 
the deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them, there could not be com-
munities of character, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women 
with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of their com-
mon Iife.90 
Such accounts may provide a different and interesting under-
standing of the immigration power but they do not persuasively 
support the conclusion that "membership decisions are a different 
order of importance from most other decisions subjected to consti-
tutional scrutiny."9I Furthermore, as noted above, there are sub-
stantial risks in using the immigration power to define "ideal 
members" of our national community. To the extent they reflect 
majority preferences, membership decisions may display virulent in-
tolerance based on race, political opinion, or life style.92 The Alien 
and Sedition Acts and Chinese Exclusion laws, as well as ideologi-
cal exclusion grounds currently in force, shculd serve as cautionary 
examples to those who would urge that the immigration power be 
left unconstrained by the Constitution in order to promote the 
maintenance of "communities of character." 
Happily, "self-definition" has rarely been a central aspect of 
immigration regulation. The vast majority of immigration decisions 
are not club membership rules carefully crafted to preserve a partic-
ular group identity. They are much closer to university admission 
policies than they are to rules regulating religious conversions. We 
choose how many aliens to admit based on economic, social, and 
88. United States ex ref. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (power to 
exclude aliens "stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power 
to control the foreign affairs of the nation"). 
89. E.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) ("Policies pertaining to the entry of 
aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of 
government.") 
90. WALZER, supra note 76, at 32. 
91. Martin, supra note I, at 199. 
92. There may be some deep psychological need that is served here. Do we help to 
maintain internal tolerance by having a forum (immigration regulation) for venting our 
intolerance? 
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moral considerations, attempting to screen out individuals who are 
likely to threaten the public health, welfare, or security. The immi-
gration power is thus roughly analogous to the commerce power. It 
is an important instrument for channeling and controlling economic 
and social development, and for nursing humanitarian goals (such 
as the admission of refugees). And, like the commerce power, it has 
significant implications for our relations with foreign nations. To be 
sure, immigration regulations reflect deep social norms and under-
standings. For example, family reunification policies are based on 
prevailing American definitions of the "nuclear family." But our 
immigration laws are not primarily concerned with the construction 
or maintenance of a particular kind of community. 
We can end immigration exceptionalism by recognizing the 
weaknesses of earlier justifications93 and by resisting the siren song 
of membership theory. The immigration power should be brought 
within the fold of other congressional powers and subjected to the 
constitutional limits normally applied to those powers. 
93. A number of scholars have already accomplished this task. See, e.g., Legomsky, 
supra note I; Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 804 (1983); Rosberg, supra note 43. 
